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A B S T R AC T
This socio-economic study scrutinizes the bidding process for an Olympic Games in democratic 
countries and authoritarian states. More specifically, transaction cost economics is employed as a 
lens to analyse the bidding processes for the Winter Olympic Games in 2022 and the Summer Games 
in 2024 and 2028. Against the backdrop of these case studies, it becomes obvious that recent devel-
opments result in serious problems for the IOC, which is why the organization has to keep a certain 
strategic proximity to authoritarian states. This measure can be considered an insurance policy be-
cause of the high and likely sunk ex ante transaction costs that characterize bids from democratic 
countries. It will become apparent that keeping good working relations with authoritarian govern-
ments helps the IOC to secure the future of its main revenue driver, the Olympic Games, thus pro-
viding for its own future. Furthermore, the IOC’s decision to include the Summer Olympic Games in 
2028 in the bidding process originally geared towards the Games in 2024 will be outlined as a logical 
consequence of the developments that are analysed in this study. This strategic move will turn out to 
be a logical consequence of the developments that are analysed in this paper.
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Introduction
Staging the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) flagship 
event, the Olympic Games, has undergone a drastic demise in 
popularity as can be seen by the high number of potential host 
cities that dropped out of the bidding process for the Games in 
2022 and 2024/28. In the bidding race for the Winter Games in 
2022, all eight potential hosts from democratic countries termi-
nated their bidding efforts before the IOC’s final vote, which left 
two cities from authoritarian states as potential hosts: Almaty 
(Kazakhstan) and Beijing (China). Both countries, Kazakhstan 
and China, are linked to issues such as human rights violations 
and lacking freedom of press, which is why some do not con-
sider either one an ideal location for an “event that aims for 
global community and inclusiveness” (Barrabi, 2015). The cur-
rent bidding process for the Summer Games in 2024 has also 
suffered from unfavourable referenda and withdrawn bids. 
Only two of a total of seven cities have prevailed: Los Angeles 
(USA) and Paris (France), both of which are located in western 
democracies. Most likely motivated by the fleeting interest in 
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staging Olympic Games especially in democratic countries, the 
IOC has just recently decided to not only award the 2024-Sum-
mer Games in the current bidding process, but to include the 
Games in 2028 as well. Thus, neither Paris nor Los Angeles has 
to be refused as Olympic host. 
One major factor that differentiates these bidding processes 
from prior ones is the fact that referenda have become a com-
mon tool to examine the public’s support in many countries. 
From stakeholder theory (Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson & Preston, 
1995; Freeman, 2008) it is clear that public support is a major 
asset for countries and regions interested in bidding for and 
staging a mega sport event because the general public and 
especially local residents are key stakeholders for such endeav-
ours (Preuss, 2008, 2013; Preuss & Solberg, 2006). But contrary 
to what could be expected from past research (Atkinson, Mour-
ato, Szymanski, & Ozdemiroglu, 2008; Barget & Gouguet, 2007; 
Heisey, 2009; Heyne & Süssmuth, 2007), almost all of the refer-
enda turned out dismissive in the bidding processes for 2022 
and 2024/28. And even after the only supportive referendum 
in Oslo (Norway) the bid was terminated prematurely for po-
litical reasons at a later point in time. Political concerns have 
also ended bids in other democracies in both bidding process-
es. Overall, thirteen of the originally seventeen cities that had 
somewhat audibly declared interest in staging the Olympic 
Games in 2022 or 2024/28 and/or held a referendum on that 
matter dropped out before the IOC’s vote on the host. In total, 
six referenda were held and eight bids were terminated with-
out referendum or after a confirmative one because of political 
concerns. But contrary to the many bids from democratic coun-
tries that did not outlast the challenges of the bidding process, 
the two cities from authoritarian states both maintained their 
bids until the IOC cast its final vote. 
In this socio-economic study, the bidding processes for the 
Winter Olympic Games in 2022 and the Summer Games in 2024 
and 2028 serve as case studies to scrutinize the decisions linked 
to the bidding process in democratic countries and authoritar-
ian states. Transaction cost economics is employed as a lens to 
outline the problems that the findings pose for the IOC and to 
understand why the organization has to keep a certain prox-
imity to authoritarian states for strategic reasons. This measure 
can be considered an insurance policy because of the high and 
likely sunk ex ante transaction costs that characterize bids from 
democratic countries. It will become apparent that keeping 
good working relations with authoritarian governments helps 
the IOC to secure the future of its main revenue driver, the Olym-
pic Games, thus providing for its own future. Furthermore, the 
IOC’s decision to include the Summer Olympic Games in 2028 
in the bidding process originally geared towards the Games in 
2024 will be outlined as a logical consequence of the develop-
ments that are analysed in this study. This strategic move will 
turn out to be a logical consequence of the developments that 
are analysed in this paper.
The paper is structured as follows: In the next chapter, trans-
action cost economics is briefly introduced. Afterwards, the 
case studies of the bidding processes for 2022 and 2024/28 are 
presented. In the first part of the chapter, general background 
information is provided, the second part outlines specific as-
pects that are relevant for the scope of this paper. In the fol-
lowing chapter, the decisions and developments that are typi-
cal of democratic and authoritarian countries during a bidding 
process for Olympic Games will be contrasted. The final chap-
ter provides a discussion and reviews some of the IOC’s recent 
strategic decisions against the background of the findings of 
this paper.
Transaction cost economics
Transaction cost economics focus on costs caused by different 
types of transactions. The basis of such transactions are rela-
tions between the concerned actors that can be understood as 
implicit or explicit contracts. All complex contracts are invari-
ably incomplete because it is impossible to incorporate (satis-
factory) solutions for all possible future developments already 
at the time of the initiation of a contract (Klein, 1998, pp. 13-14). 
This incompleteness can be attributed to bounded rationality, 
i.e. the inability of the involved parties to have access to and 
take into account all information that could possibly be rele-
vant for the contract (limited information) as well as a limited 
decision time. Furthermore, opportunistic behaviour by one 
or more of the parties involved can be or can become a factor 
(Sam, Batty, & Dean, 2005, pp. 5-6). 
As Williamson points out, transaction costs of various types ex-
ist. There are the initial or “ex ante costs of drafting, negotiat-
ing and safeguarding an agreement” (Williamson, 1994, p. 103). 
Due to the incompleteness of contracts there are also “the ex 
post costs of maladaptation and adjustment that arise when 
contract execution is misaligned as a result of gaps, errors, 
omissions, and unanticipated disturbances” (ibd.), e.g. oppor-
tunistic behaviour or other unexpected developments. 
This means that contract partners do frequently not oper-
ate harmoniously but have to expect delays, breakdowns, 
and other malfunctions in their transactions. Consequently, 
the costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring have to be 
taken into consideration when analysing transactions in order 
to judge their viability (Williamson, 1981, pp. 552-553). While 
“[s]ome transactions are simple and easy to mediate. Others 
are difficult and require a good deal more attention” (William-
son, 1981, p. 553). Especially in the latter type monitoring, re-
peated negotiations, and enforcement mechanisms will be of 
high importance. These can be considered “costs” stemming 
from bounded rationality or the effort to prevent potentially 
opportunistic behaviour. 
If the IOC wants to award an Olympic Games, ex ante and ex 
post transaction costs are relevant. Ex post costs occur after the 
host has been chosen and the host contract signed. These in-
clude monitoring the preparations for the event or renegotia-
tions of the original agreement (like for Tokyo 2020 where many 
venues including the main stadium are reconsidered to reduce 
costs). Furthermore, they obviously occur during the event, but 
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a referendum had yielded a supportive result with 55.1 percent 
of the voters in favour of bidding (Goddard, 2013). However, 
the Norwegian national government eventually decided not to 
back the bid because of financial concerns. Thus, Oslo also with-
drew its candidature and did not deliver a Bid Book (Figure 1).  
Since all European cities had discontinued their efforts before 
the final decision by the IOC, the Candidate Cities from Kazakh-
stan and China were left as only possible hosts. Ultimately, the 
2022 Winter Olympic Games were awarded to Beijing (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Overview over the bidding process for the 2022 Win-
ter Olympic Games (logos denote at which stage 
a city left the bidding process or lost the IOC’s final 
election)
In total, four of the potential hosts from Europe conducted ref-
erenda on their bids for the 2022 Winter Olympic Games. Three 
of these were dismissive, immediately ending the bids. Only 
the referendum in Oslo turned out supportive. But this bid was 
stopped due to political concerns. Against this background it 
has to be noted that referenda relating to (bids for) Olympic 
Games are a rather new phenomenon in most countries and 
only few prior examples can be found. 
Before to the Winter Games in Salt Lake City (Utah) in 2002, 
a poll yielded a favourable vote (57 percent) in 1989 (Guala, 
2009). This referendum to use part of the sales tax revenues 
for the construction of Olympic facilities was the only one in 
which US-American citizens could vote during the bidding pro-
cess (Andranovich, Burbank, & Heying, 2001). In 1994, there 
was a successful vote in Atlanta on issuing two bonds for the 
1996-Games, whereas the 1978-vote in Los Angeles refused to 
use city general funds for the Games in 1980. In 1972 voters 
in a  referendum in Denver (USA) voted against making funds 
available for the 1976-Winter Games, which is why the event 
was re-awarded to Innsbruck (Austria) (Moore, 2015). These 
last three referenda were held after the IOC had awarded the 
Games to the cities. Unlike the referenda during the 2022-bid-
ding process, neither of the US-American referenda concerned 
the question whether to bid or not.
also afterwards (for example, when legacy programs are to be 
implemented, which frequently does happen as expected). Ex 
ante costs are all efforts invested in the bidding process, such 
as meetings, negotiations, travels, etc. until a host city contract 
is finalized. In this analysis, the focus is put on ex ante costs dur-
ing the bidding process. But it can be assumed that many of 
our considerations should also be applicable for an analysis of 
ex post costs occurring after the host has been chosen.
Case studies: The bidding processes for the 
Olympic Games in 2022 and 2024/28
Background
In order to have a realistic chance to succeed, a city’s ambition 
to host Olympic Games has to be supported by the regional 
and national government, the National Olympic Committee 
(NOC), and other sport organizations. The support of the lat-
ter two is crucial because they have to lobby for the bid and 
secure support within the “Olympic family”. Furthermore, and 
unlike often expected by the public, the NOC eventually has to 
nominate the city as “Applicant City” to the IOC. Political sup-
port is also crucial because several declarations and guarantees 
have to be issued by the respective governments and/or ad-
ministrations. Against this background, the bidding process for 
the Winter Olympic Games in 2022 can be considered a turn-
ing point in the history of the IOC and the Olympic Movement, 
which is why it will be looked into in the next paragraphs. 
As in many earlier bidding processes, being named the na-
tional “Applicant City” by the respective NOC was one of the 
many pitfalls that had to be overcome when a city wanted to 
host the 2022-Games. Only half of the originally eight poten-
tial hosts from Europe attained this status alongside Beijing 
(China) and Almaty (Kazakhstan). The withdrawals of Zaragoza 
and Barcelona occurred because of political concerns (Mackay, 
2013; Marca.com, 2011). In Munich and Graubünden failed ref-
erenda ended the cities’ bidding efforts (Könecke, Schubert, & 
Preuß, 2016). Thus, the originally very satisfactory number of 
ten potential hosts had already been reduced to six before the 
application phase really got going (Figure 1).
The next major step was the submission of the Application File, 
also called “Mini Bid Book”. With the Swedish Applicant City of 
Stockholm another potential host from Europe withdrew be-
fore submitting the file (Figure 1). This decision was taken be-
cause of political concerns regarding the cost of the Games. 
After the submission of the Application Files, the IOC executive 
board selected the Candidate Cities that would get the oppor-
tunity to submit a Candidature File or “Bid Book”. Yet, before the 
nomination of the Candidate Cities, two more cities from Eu-
rope left the bidding race: Lviv (Ukraine) withdrew because of 
the crisis in the country and Krakow (Poland) did so because of 
yet another dismissive referendum. 
As a result, the Norwegian city of Oslo was the only remaining 
European Candidate City alongside Almaty and Beijing. In Oslo 
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mer Games right away, so that Paris now will host the Games 
in 2024 and Los Angeles the ones in 2028 (Carroll & Melander, 
2017; International Olympic Committee, 2017).
Relevant observations
As has been mentioned before, a specificity of the bidding pro-
cesses for the Olympic Games in 2022 and 2024/28 was a surge 
in popularity for referenda in Europe. Four of the potential hosts 
for the Games in 2022 (Graubünden, Krakow, Munich, and Oslo) 
and two for the Games in 2024/28 (Hamburg and Vienna) con-
ducted referenda, of which only the one in Oslo supported the 
bid. Furthermore, four of the 2022-bids were withdrawn due 
to political concerns related to staging the Games (Barcelona, 
Zaragoza, Stockholm, and Oslo). Even though Lviv (Ukraine) 
also had to terminate its bid for political reasons, making it the 
fifth city with this reason in the 2022-bidding race, its with-
drawal was not driven by a political unwillingness to stage the 
event. On the contrary, Lviv had to withdraw because of the 
violent conflict within Ukraine, which did not allow a continu-
ation of the bid despite an affirmative political climate (Thom-
son Reuters, 2014), which makes it a very special case. Of the 
bids for 2024, three were withdrawn because of political con-
cerns (Boston, Rome, and Budapest), whereas Budapest’s city 
council did so to prevent a likely negative referendum. These 
findings regarding the reasons for not keeping up an initial in-
terest in hosting an Olympic Games are summarized in Table 1.
But not only the bids that were prematurely terminated allow 
interesting insights: At the end of the bidding process for the 
Games in 2022, all European cities had dropped out and only 
the Candidate Cities from Kazakhstan and China were left as 
possible hosts. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
(EIU) Democracy Index both countries have to be considered 
authoritarian regimes and are classified as “not free” in terms 
of political rights and civil liberties in the report “Freedom in 
the World” (FiW) (Table 1). Since the IOC did not strongly insist 
during the bidding process, heavy criticism arose because of 
the countries’ “terrible” (Barrabi, 2015) or “extremely poor hu-
man rights records” (Human Rights Watch, 2015) and lacking 
freedom of press due to which neither country was considered 
an ideal location for an “event that aims for global community 
and inclusiveness” (Barrabi, 2015) by many. 
In the bidding process that was originally geared towards 
awarding the Olympic Games in 2024, the IOC just recently 
has taken the self-proclaimed “historic decision” (International 
Olympic Committee, 2017) of awarding both of the remaining 
bidders with an Olympic Games (Paris with 2024, Los Angeles 
with 2028) (Table 1). This decision is most likely spurred by the 
effort to prevent antagonizing one of the two cities when elect-
ing the other one as the host for 2024. This could have meant 
to lose yet another potential host from a democratic country 
as future host if the city had decided against another bid. Fur-
thermore, the IOC thus gained four more years before having to 
conduct the next bidding process for Summer Games.
In Europe voting on (bidding for) Olympic Games has generally 
been uncommon, even though Guala (2009) identifies three 
Swiss referenda with positive outcomes since 1928 (St. Moritz 
in 1928 and 1948, Sion in 2002) and several others uncertain or 
clearly against bidding (Valais, Interlaken, Davos). But it has to 
be kept in mind that referenda are a central element of Swiss 
democracy, which is why they are also held on sport events. 
Guala only notes one further European referendum prior to 
the turn of the century. In 1991, 84.7 percent of the voters in 
the Italian Aosta Valley – located at the Swiss border – voted 
against bidding for the 1998 Winter Olympic Games. Further-
more, two supportive referenda were held in Salzburg (Austria) 
in 1997 (regarding the Winter Games in 2006) and in 2005 (re-
garding 2014) (News.at, 2006).
The sudden popularity of referenda and their slim chances of 
turning out successfully as well as the attrition of European cit-
ies during the bidding process for the Winter Olympic Games in 
2022 was a major motivation for the IOC to restructure the bid-
ding process. This was done as one corner stone of the “Olym-
pic Agenda 2020”, “the IOC’s strategic roadmap for the future 
of the Olympic Movement” (International Olympic Committee, 
2014). The new bidding process now consists of an “Invitation 
Phase” that does not include a formal commitment to bid and a 
“Candidature Phase”, which comprises three stages. “Each stage 
will address different elements of the cities’ proposals” (Inter-
national Olympic Committee, n.d.a) and end with filing the ap-
propriate documents with the IOC. “After each submission, the 
IOC Executive Board will confirm the transition of the cities to 
the next stage. […] Finally, […] the IOC members elect the host 
city” (ibd.). 
But despite these efforts by the IOC, unfavourable referenda 
and withdrawn bids continued during the current bidding 
process for the Summer Olympic Games in 2024/28. In Vienna 
(Austria) an overwhelming 72 percent of the participants voted 
against bidding for the Games in 2028 (Crook, 2013; Magis-
trat der Stadt Wien, 2013) and voters in Hamburg (Germany) 
declined bidding for the 2024-Games by 52 percent. This even 
though Germany’s NOC had supported Hamburg’s bidding am-
bition over those of Berlin because prior surveys in both cities 
had shown a higher support in Hamburg (Könecke et al., 2016). 
Boston withdrew from the bidding race for 2024 because of po-
litical concerns and was replaced by Los Angeles as potential 
US-American host (Dampf, 2016). In Rome, the newly elected 
mayor Virginia Raggi had opposed the city’s bid during the 
electoral campaign (New York Times, 2016) and put an end to 
the Olympic ambitions after taking office. Budapest (Hungary) 
long resisted the calls for a referendum as the city council had 
decided against holding one. However, a petition for a poll was 
signed so often that the city council dropped the bid before the 
referendum took place (Dampf, 2016; Livingstone, 2016; Mor-
gan, 2017). Consequently, only Paris (France) – where the coun-
cil also had decided against a referendum – and Los Angeles 
(USA) remained as potential hosts in the bidding process origi-
nally geared towards awarding the Summer Games in 2024. 
Against this backdrop, the IOC decided to award the next Sum-
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Olympic Games. The Ukraine was classified as “partly free” and 
“hybrid regime”, respectively. 
As a backdrop for the further analysis it has to be pointed out 
that the FiW-report assesses “rights and freedoms enjoyed by 
individuals” (Freedom House, 2017) and the EIU’s Democracy 
Index “is based on five categories: electoral process and plu-
ralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political 
participation; and political culture“ (The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2015, p. 44). That means that in each of the countries la-
belled as democratic and free the opportunity to participate in 
or influence the political process is fairly good. Institutions and 
individuals are rather independent of the central government, 
political opposition is not oppressed, and opinions can be ex-
pressed rather freely. 
This means that if a city in these democracies considers bidding 
for an Olympic Games, a general decision to bid has to be taken 
Against the backdrop of the developments in the recent bidding 
processes in general and the findings summarized in  Table 1 in 
specific, the differences in the bidding processes in democracies 
and authoritarian states will be analysed here after.
Results: The bidding process in democratic and 
authoritarian countries
It can be seen in Table 1 that the two hosts for the Olympic 
Games in 2024 and 2028 and almost all countries which have 
left any of the observed bidding processes prematurely are la-
belled as “free” in the FiW-report and classified as (either full or 
flawed) “democracies” in the EIU’s Democracy Index. The only 
exception is Lviv (Ukraine) which dropped out because of a vio-
lent conflict even though the political will still was to host an 
Bidding 
process 
for OG in 
…
City Country Freedom in 
the World-
report 20171
Economist 
Intelligence 
Unit’s 
Democracy 
Index 20162
In case of 
referendum: 
Referendum 
against bid?
Bid 
terminated 
due to 
political 
concerns?
Host City 
for Games 
in …
2022 Zaragoza Spain free (94) 8.3 YES
Barcelona Spain free (94) 8.3 YES
Munich Germany free (95) 8.6 YES
Graubünden Switzerland free (96) 9.1 YES
Stockholm Sweden free (100) 9.4 YES
Lviv Ukraine partly free (61) 5.7 YES3
. Krakow Poland free (89) 6.8 YES
Oslo Norway free (100) 9.9 NO YES
Almaty Kazakhstan not free (22) 3.1 NOT elected
Beijing China not free (15) 3.1 2022
2024/28 Boston USA free (89) 8.0 YES
Vienna Austria free (95) 8.4 YES
Hamburg Germany free (95) 8.6 YES
Rome Italy free (89) 8.0 YES
Budapest Hungary free (76) 6.7 THREAT4 YES
Paris France free (90) 7.9 20245
Los Angeles USA free (89) 8.0 20285
Table 1: Overview over the cities interested in staging the Olympic Games in 2022 and 2024/28
1  total score ranging from 100 (most free) to 0 (least free) with three categories (free – partly free – not free) 
2  total score ranging from 10 (highest) to 0 (lowest) (all values rounded to first decimal) with 8-10 (full democracy) – 6-7.9 (flawed democracy) – 4-5.9 
(hybrid regime) – below 4 (authoritarian regime) 
3  Lviv had to withdraw its bid because of the violent conflict within the country despite the political will to stage Olympic Games.
4  In Budapest a referendum would have been held if the city council had not terminated the bid beforehand.
5  The IOC decided to include the Olympic Games in 2028 in the bidding process for 2024 after all bidders except Paris and Los Angeles had 
discontinued their bids.
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•	 Oslo’s	 referendum	 was	 supportive.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 bid	
Bid Book was not handed in since the national government 
refused to cover cost overruns. This shows that even a suc-
cessful referendum cannot guarantee that a bid will prevail 
until the IOC’s final decision but that the decision to main-
tain a bid is a political one and an affirmative referendum is 
just one aspect in this regard (Figure 2). 
These remarks emphasize that the decisions depicted in 
Figure 2 cannot be considered sequential because a referen-
dum can be held at any time during a bidding process and the 
decision to bid can be overturned at virtually any stage of the 
bidding process. Consequently, the circles in Figure 2 indicate 
that the decisions to bid for an Olympic Games, to hold a refer-
endum, and to maintain a bid are lasting processes that involve 
a multitude stakeholders. Yet, the negative outcome of a ref-
erendum – if one is held – immediately finalizes the decision 
not to bid because it is almost impossible that a politician in a 
democratic country would act against such a referendum after 
it were held.
Contrary to the one in democracies, decisions regarding the 
bidding process in countries that are classified “not free” in the 
FiW-report and “authoritarian regimes” in the EIU’s Democracy 
Index should be very different. Here, the government is not 
legitimized by free and democratic elections and individuals, 
sport organizations, or regional and local governments are 
not rather independent of a nation’s political leadership. This 
means that if a decision to bid is communicated to the IOC, it 
is very likely to be upheld for good. External factors within the 
by a sufficiently large number of initial supporters in politics 
and the sports world in order to initiate a bid. Afterwards, two 
more major decisions follow: one is whether to hold a referen-
dum, the other is whether to maintain a bid until the final vote 
by the IOC. As will briefly be illustrated by some examples from 
the case studies, these “decisions” usually are no singular inci-
dents but processes or series of decisions: 
•	 Munich’s	city	council	initially	decided	to	hold	a	referendum	
when it voted on entering another bidding race after the 
IOC’s final vote for the 2018-Winter Games had been cast for 
Pyeongchang (South Korea). Nevertheless, the referendum 
was not the first step in the bidding process. Its preparation 
was only one of many actions that were undertaken simul-
taneously. But its outcome ended all further preparations at 
once. This is why in Figure 2 only the outcome of a referen-
dum is modelled as “singular decision”.
•	 Budapest’s	 city	 council	 voted	 against	 a	 referendum	 by	 a	
tight vote of 16 to 14. Nevertheless, a journalist kept try-
ing to force a referendum. After failing with this attempt on 
a national level, she tried it on the city level (Pavitt, 2016). 
Ultimately, a petition calling for a referendum was signed 
by many more people than would have been required. As 
a reaction, the city council withdrew its support for the bid, 
thus terminating it (Morgan, 2017). Consequently, the deci-
sion to hold a referendum in a democratic state in Figure 2 
is a process that can be considered latent until the bidding 
process is either over or the bidder drops out. Theoretically, 
it could also be possible to hold multiple referenda on a sin-
gle bid.
Figure 2: Decisions in a democratic country and an authori tarian state during the bidding process
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brand image this generates in democratic countries (Könecke 
et al., 2016). These effects became obvious when the IOC was 
left with two authoritarian states as only potential hosts of the 
Winter Olympic Games in 2022. Like it has been observed in 
a sport sponsorship context, this caused “intangible costs [due 
to] an erosion of public goodwill because of the [transaction 
partners’] image” (Sam et al., 2005, p. 9). In this regard, it has to 
be taken into account that even beforehand, the IOC had been 
closely associated with authoritarian states, which seemingly 
was one reason for the failed referendum in Munich (Könecke 
et al., 2016). This means that the “perceived loss of autonomy 
for the sport organisation” (Sam et al., 2005, p. 9) and proximity 
to authoritarian governments was aggravated by the develop-
ment of the bidding process.
Against this backdrop, it is interesting to observe the strategy 
the IOC chose in dealing with another authoritarian transaction 
partner who violated the following central claim of the organi-
zation:
“The IOC’s priority is the protection of the clean athletes 
and to support them on and off the field of play. This 
means that any investment in the fight against doping 
and against match-fixing, manipulation of competition 
and related corruption, whether it be for education, 
testing, research, logistics or staffing, cannot be consid-
ered as a cost but as an investment in the clean athletes” 
(International Olympic Committee, n.d.c).
Before the Olympic Games in 2016, the McLaren-report had 
uncovered systematic and government-supported doping of 
Russian athletes prior to the “home” Winter Olympic Games 
in Sochi in 2014. But the IOC did not distance itself from the 
authoritarian government in Russia, thus failing to prove its 
willingness to be true to its values or emphasizing its inde-
pendence. Instead, it virtually refrained from banning the Rus-
sian team or any of its athletes for the Summer Games in 2016 
because it only excluded – or pretended to exclude – Russian 
athletes who had previously been banned for doping offenses. 
Since these athletes were punished a second time for their vio-
lation, they could appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(CAS) which had deemed this practice as incompatible with 
the existing regulations and thus invalid in a similar case. IOC-
president Thomas Bach – a lawyer and experienced sports poli-
tician – who headed the relevant committee must have been 
aware of this fact. The general decision on how to deal with 
those athletes who had not been punished for violating dop-
ing regulations before, was delegated to the respective sports’ 
world federations even though these are not formally involved 
in organizing Olympic Games. This in turn did not only create 
an uneven treatment of athletes from different sports but had 
the effect that a vast majority of Russia’s Olympic team could 
participate. 
The only permanent “exclusion” of a Russian athlete by the IOC 
was that the Russian whistle-blower Julia Stepanowa who had 
contributed to uncovering the fraudulent system was not al-
country (elections, referenda, and public or political pressure) 
are not relevant. If compared to the many stakeholders and po-
tential pitfalls in democracies, only a rather small number of de-
cision-makers should be involved in authoritarian states since, 
for instance, interest groups, local politicians, or office-holders 
in sport organizations are far less likely to forcefully oppose the 
central government’s decisions. Due to this and much unlike 
in democratic countries, a bid will meet strong support after it 
has been decided upon by political leadership. Consequently, 
the bidding process in authoritarian states only comprises one 
major decision process involving only a rather small number of 
relevant stakeholders (Figure 2). 
Applying transaction cost economics to the findings summed 
up in Figure 2, it can be concluded that bids from democracies 
obviously comprise much higher ex ante transaction costs for 
the IOC than those from authoritarian states. The development 
of such a bid is much more uncertain (for example regarding 
a potential referendum) and it involves many more stakehold-
ers (regional and national politicians, the public, the media etc.) 
whose behaviour during the process is rather uncertain and 
can change rapidly. Thus, bids from democratic countries are 
very costly transactions for the IOC because of long negotia-
tion processes and the high likelihood that all investments on 
behalf of the IOC become sunk costs. This is the case if a bid 
of a generally suitable bidder is terminated prematurely (c. f. 
Klein, 1998, p. 16 who illustrates comparable observations for 
transactions of a sponsor with a sport organization) and not 
renewed for future Olympic Games. For instance, this was the 
case in Munich, where a referendum ended the bid for 2022 
after having lost the final vote for 2018. This poll also made fu-
ture bids from the region highly unlikely for quite some time 
to come. A similar situation could have occurred in the current 
process for 2024/28 since Paris was specifically aiming at cel-
ebrating the centenary of the 1924-Games in the city and prob-
ably would not have run again for 2028. 
Due to the far less complex and insecure process outlined in 
Figure 2, a bid by an authoritarian state is a much less costly 
transaction for the IOC as far as the ex ante transaction costs 
before signing the host contract are concerned. Fewer stake-
holders influence the decision, which considerably diminishes 
negotiation and control costs for the IOC. Furthermore, the like-
lihood of a premature termination has turned out to be very 
low if compared to democracies during the bidding process for 
the Games in 2022.
Discussion
This study analysed recent developments in the bidding pro-
cess for Olympic Games. It became obvious, that (western) de-
mocracies are far less reliable bidders than authoritarian states 
and that their bids incur much higher ex ante transaction costs. 
This observation could be one major strategic motivation for 
the IOC to actively strengthen its ties to authoritarian govern-
ments despite the opposition and detrimental effects on its 
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tarian countries. Against the backdrop of transaction cost eco-
nomics, it could thus be argued that taking the blame for not 
insisting on the strict enforcement of civil rights and freedom of 
press during the bidding process for 2022 or failing to severely 
punish systematic state-doping in Russia prior to the Games in 
2016 must have been considered less costly by the IOC than 
losing an insurance for the Olympic Games and – because of 
its heavy financial dependency on the Games – ultimately the 
IOC itself. 
A related consideration is applicable to the change of strategy 
in the bidding process for 2024/28. Despite having conducted 
a bidding process for 2024, the IOC is now awarding the Games 
in 2028 as well. This strategic flexibility enabled the organiza-
tion to attain two aims: On the one hand, it has gained con-
siderable time before having to conduct the next bidding pro-
cess for Summer Olympic Games. On the other, it has assured 
that after the Games in Tokyo in 2020, also the two following 
Summer Games will be staged in democratic countries. This 
could enable the IOC to conduct a long-term branding strategy 
geared towards lessening its perceived proximity to authoritar-
ian countries. This should especially be possible because the 
next hosts, Tokyo, Paris, and Los Angeles, are very attractive 
destinations in rather stable democracies. 
Concluding the paper, some limitations have to be pointed 
out. First of all, the analyses relate to specific observations and 
conclusions regarding recent developments connected to the 
Olympic Games and Olympic bidding processes. Consequent-
ly, it cannot be expected that all potential decisions, contracts, 
and transactions costs that can occur in the IOC’s relations with 
democratic or authoritarian governments have been looked 
into. But since the aim of this paper was to specifically scruti-
nize developments and related ex ante transaction costs for the 
bidding process, this limitation is part of the research agenda. 
Moreover, transaction costs are not the only reason why an in-
ternational organization upholds good working relations with 
a government – be it democratic or authoritarian. Personal ac-
quaintances and preferences as well as other strategic consid-
erations or influences than the ones that have been looked into 
in this paper are of central importance as well. For example, 
conquering new markets or broadening the fan base of specific 
sports or sport in general can also be strong motivators. This 
means that this paper is not to be understood as an exhaustive 
analysis of the IOC’s strategic management of its relations to 
authoritarian or democratic governments but of one specific 
aspect of this relation.
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lowed to participate in the Games in 2016 under the IOC’s neu-
tral flag. This had been her only remaining option because she 
had not been nominated by Russia’s NOC after her defection 
even though she had met the formal requirements. Having her 
participate in the Olympics would certainly have been well-re-
ceived in most democratic countries but would likely have had 
the opposite effect in Russia – and probably in other authoritar-
ian states. The same would have been true of any kind of actual 
punishment for the systematic, government-supported doping 
in Russia. 
When facing the strategic question how to deal with the McLar-
en-report’s findings right before the Olympics in Rio, the IOC 
had to choose between two scenarios: It could either dam-
age its reputation in democratic countries (further) or loose 
reputation in authoritarian ones. Given that “transaction costs 
economics tries to explain how trading partners choose, from 
the set of feasible alternatives, the arrangement that protects 
their relationship-specific investments at the least cost” (Klein, 
1998, pp. 15-16), the question arises, why compromising cen-
tral values and openly fortifying the perceived dependence on 
authoritarian regimes – both of which will increase costs for fu-
ture transactions with democracies and IOC-sponsors – seem-
ingly constituted the more attractive option in this situation. 
Here, the IOC’s heavy dependence on the Olympic Games 
has to be considered. The Games are the organization’s main 
source of income (International Olympic Committee, n.d.b) and 
virtually all its revenues stem from the Games either directly or 
indirectly. But – as has been outlined in this paper – democra-
cies have become very likely to not see their bids through to 
the end. That means that the transaction costs of these bids 
and their high probability of becoming sunk costs for the IOC 
in case of a withdrawal, could potentially pose an existential 
threat to the IOC if it were left without a potential host city or 
if an elected host city should refuse to stage on short notice. 
Despite Innsbruck had stepped in as substitute host for Denver 
for the Winter Games in 1976, it is highly unlikely that a demo-
cratic country could fill such an opening nowadays because of 
the insecure and long-lasting process involving a large number 
of stakeholders depicted in Figure 2. An authoritarian state, on 
the other hand, might be inclined to step up if it were invited 
by the IOC since only one major choice would have to be taken 
involving considerably less relevant parties (Figure 2). 
This shows that disadvantages resulting from the IOC’s ties to 
authoritarian states can strategically be acceptable because 
they can be considered an insurance fee for a time without a 
potential host for an Olympic Games (i.e. if all potential hosts 
drop out of a bidding process or if a successful bidder even-
tually refuses to stage the event). In such an instance, the IOC 
would most likely be dependent on an authoritarian regime to 
come to its aide on short notice because of the long and trans-
action rich process in western democracies depicted in Figure 
2. Since being left without a (potential) Olympic host would 
threaten the IOC’s existence due to the financial importance 
of the event, it seems strategically viable for the organization 
to go to great lengths to protect its relationship with authori-
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